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We propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze the long-run impact of the electricity market 
design on transmission line expansion by the regulator and investment in generation capacity by private 
ﬁrms in liberalized electricity markets. The model incorporates investment decisions of the transmission 
system operator and private ﬁrms in expectation of an energy-only market and cost-based redispatch. 
In different speciﬁcations we consider the cases of one vs. multiple price zones (market splitting) and 
analyze different approaches to recover network cost—in particular lump sum, generation capacity based, 
and energy based fees. In order to compare the outcomes of our multilevel market model with a ﬁrst 
best benchmark, we also solve the corresponding integrated planner problem. Using two test networks 
we illustrate that energy-only markets can lead to suboptimal locational decisions for generation capacity 
and thus imply excessive network expansion. Market splitting heals these problems only partially. These 
results are valid for all considered types of network tariffs, although investment slightly differs across 
those regimes. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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0. Introduction 
Following the British privatization in the 1980s, various coun-
ries around the world liberalized their electricity sectors. Today,
n most industrialized countries only the transmission network re-
ains regulated while private ﬁrms decide on investment in gen-
ration capacities and trade electricity on markets. This structure
hallenges the planning of transmission and generation capacity
xpansion. While an entirely regulated electricity sector allows
or simultaneous transmission and generation expansion planning,
n a liberalized market, investment decisions in transmission and
eneration capacities are taken by different agents. Investment in
eneration capacities is typically made by ﬁrms and private in-∗ Corresponding author at: Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 
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377-2217/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uestors based on their expectations concerning the future regula-
ory environment. Network expansion, however, is decided on by
egulated ﬁrms (or even the regulator), in anticipation of capacity
nvestments by private ﬁrms. Traditional optimization approaches,
hich only consider integrated transmission and generation ex-
ansion planning, reveal the optimal expansion plan for transmis-
ion and generation but do not offer valuable information on how
o achieve those goals in a mixed market/non-market environment.
n a liberalized market, incentives induced by the interplay of the
arket environment and regulation determine whether ﬁrms make
he appropriate investment choices. As our results clearly reveal,
he proper design of market rules providing adequate incentives
n those markets crucially matters. Liberalized electricity markets
hus call for new tools to inform the various agents involved: reg-
lators, electricity ﬁrms, investors, and other stakeholders. 
In this paper we propose a model that allows to analyze in-
estment decisions by the regulator and private ﬁrms in liber-
lized electricity markets. We model energy-only markets and
 regulated transmission system operator (TSO) who uses cost-
ased redispatch to deal with transmission constraints. In a mul-
ilevel analysis we study transmission expansion decisions by thender the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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k  regulated TSO in anticipation of capacity expansion by private
ﬁrms. In different instantiations of our model we analyze the ef-
fects of market splitting (one vs. multiple price zones) as well as
different approaches to recover network cost—in particular a lump
sum, a generation capacity based, and an energy based fee. In or-
der to compare the outcomes to a ﬁrst best benchmark we also
solve the integrated planner problem. For the computational stud-
ies we restrict ourselves to solving stylized test cases to illustrate
the applicability of our framework. The results demonstrate that
investment choices in a market environment substantially differ
from the ﬁrst best solution. In our numerical examples the absence
of proper locational investment incentives for ﬁrms clearly affects
investment choices of generators, which, in turn, leads to exces-
sive line investment. This shows that our model allows to com-
pare different network management regimes and to quantify their
effects on long-run investment decisions. Our approach is thus an
important extension of various studies that have mainly considered
the short-run properties of different transmission management
regimes; see the literature review below. As we show, transmission
management has also important implications in the long-run when
generation and transmission expansion are taken into account. 
Let us emphasize that our approach allows to assess the long-
run impact of different transmission management regimes adopted
in liberalized electricity markets around the world. Especially in
Europe spot market trading does not fully account for transmission
constraints. In contrast, capacities are shut down and called by the
TSO in case that the spot market solution is technically infeasible.
Under cost-based redispatch (as it is used in Austria, Switzerland,
or Germany) ﬁrms called into operation are just compensated for
their variable production cost. Consequently, redispatch operations
cannot contribute to the recovery of investment cost. 1 Other lib-
eralized electricity markets adopted a system of nodal prices (see,
e.g., Joskow, 2008 ), where spot market prices directly reﬂect trans-
mission constraints (e.g., the United States, Canada, Australia, or
New Zealand), which induces more adequate incentives for gen-
eration capacities by private ﬁrms. To at least partially overcome
the lack of locational signals provided by spot market prices, sev-
eral countries that rely on a system of redispatch have introduced
price zones (e.g., Sweden and Italy). Since the ﬁrst best solution
coincides with the outcome obtained under nodal pricing in our
framework, our approach also allows to assess the long-run bene-
ﬁts of a change to this transmission management system. 
Apart from the consideration of nodal prices and price zones as
compared to a uniform price spot market, we also analyze the im-
pact of different network fee regimes. We consider a lump sum fee
as a theoretical benchmark that does not directly affect investment
decisions for generation capacity. In practice, however, network fee
regimes typically combine energy based and capacity based com-
ponents. For instance, the current practice in the UK uses “Trans-
mission Network Use of System” fees that are collected based on
power plant capacity connected to the grid, whereas “Balancing
Services Use of System Charges” fees are charged based on en-
ergy fed into the network (cf. National Grid, 2015 ). In order to
provide some insights on the desirability of different network fee
regimes, we consider the extreme cases of an energy based and
a purely capacity based network fee. The insights of Ruderer and
Zöttl (2012) that a lump sum fee yields the highest generation in-
vestment incentives and a capacity based fee the lowest (with the1 In contrast, market-based redispatch (used, e.g., in Belgium, Finland, France, or 
Sweden) may yield rents for ﬁrms that are called at the redispatch and thus induces 
incentives to build plants at locations with systematic underprovision, see Grimm, 
Martin, Sölch, Weibelzahl, and Zöttl (2016) . However, market-based redispatch is 
plagued by severe gaming problems, which obtain even for perfectly competitive 
markets. In the literature this is often referred to as the inc-dec game. For a discus- 
sion of these issues see, e.g., Neuhoff, Hobbs, and Newbery (2011) . 
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t  nergy based fee in between) are reﬂected in our computational
esults. In the discussion of our case studies we provide an intu-
tion and moreover demonstrate that the clear ranking of the net-
ork fee regimes in terms of investment incentives does not trans-
ate into a clear ranking in terms of welfare. The desirability of a
etwork fee regime rather depends on whether distortions induced
y the market design itself are alleviated or worsened by higher
nvestment. 
.1. Literature review 
Prior to the liberalization of electricity sectors around the
orld, vertically integrated monopolists (either regulated or di-
ectly state owned) were responsible for generation and transmis-
ion expansion. Such monopolists needed insights on the cost min-
mal conﬁguration of the system. As a consequence, traditionally
ost of the contributions proposed frameworks and techniques
o determine overall optimal expansion for generation and trans-
ission facilities; see, e.g., Gallego, Monticelli, and Romero (1998) ,
inato, Pereira, and Granville (2001) , Alguacil, Motto, and Conejo
2003) , or de Oliveira, da Silva, Pereira, and Carneiro (2005) . In
 recent contribution Ruiz and Conejo (2015) propose robust op-
imization techniques to analyze transmission expansion planning
nder uncertainty. 
In liberalized electricity markets, however, we observe verti-
al unbundling of transmission and generation facilities. Thus, in
ddition to insights on the global optimum of an integrated mo-
opolist, research is needed on how the market environment af-
ects decisions of different stakeholders. By now a large litera-
ure has developed, which analyzes incentives for private and po-
entially strategic ﬁrms to invest in generation facilities. However,
hese studies typically assume unlimited transmission capacity; ex-
mples are Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) , Murphy and Smeers
2005) , Joskow and Tirole (2007) , Zöttl (2010) , Fabra, von der Fehr,
nd de Frutos (2011) , de Frutos and Fabra (2011) , Grimm and Zöttl
2013) , or Wogrin, Hobbs, Ralph, Centeno, and Barquín (2013) . 
Another recent strand of literature explicitly models both gen-
ration and transmission investment typically by making use of
ilevel models. Sauma and Oren (20 06 , 20 09 ) are among the
rst to model investment incentives of generators and transmis-
ion network expansion in such a way. In their contribution they
uantify the impact of whether transmission investment antici-
ates resulting investment of strategic generation companies or
ot. Roh, Shahidehpour, and Fu (2007) propose a simulation frame-
ork to analyze investment of competitive generation companies
nd competitive merchant transmission companies. Roh, Shahideh-
our, and Wu (2009) generalize this framework to also include a
ransmission system operator as a further agent. van der Weijde
nd Hobbs (2012) provide a bilevel model of transmission expan-
ion facing uncertain investment in renewable generation. Baringo
nd Conejo (2012) propose a bilevel model together with MPEC-
nd MILP-based reformulation techniques that addresses invest-
ent in wind power plants and transmission lines in a market
nvironment. Ryan, Downward, Philpott, and Zakeri (2010) and,
n an extension, Jin and Ryan (2011) analyze expansion of elec-
ricity generation and transmission capacities together with the
xpansion of a fuel transportation network. For electricity mar-
ets, Jenabi, Ghomi, and Smeers (2013) propose a clear-cut bilevel
ramework which considers optimal network expansion by the
ransmission company, anticipating investment of competitive gen-
ration companies. Also based on a bilevel approach, O’Neill, Krall,
edman, and Oren (2013) propose an auction mechanism to im-
lement optimal investment incentives by transmission companies.
n a recent contribution Huppmann and Egerer (2015) also use a
ilevel approach to analyze the strategic interaction among several
ransmission companies and their incentives to build transmission
V. Grimm et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 254 (2016) 493–509 495 
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 apacities. All those approaches, however, do not explicitly take
nto account the speciﬁc structure of the transmission manage-
ent regime, but implicitly assume optimal management of the
ransmission network which is implemented by a regime of loca-
ional marginal prices; see Hogan (2002) . While this models in-
entives in markets where indeed a system of locational marginal
rices is implemented (as, e.g., in the United States or Canada), it
imits insights with respect to other markets that might rely on a
ystem of market splitting or coupling and redispatch, which is not
aptured by the approaches mentioned above. It is the purpose of
his article to explicitly analyze the impact of speciﬁc design fea-
ures of transmission management regimes as market splitting and
edispatch on the generation and transmission investment incen-
ives. 
Let us ﬁnally note that, in recent years, an extensive literature
as been developed, which analyzes the impact of speciﬁc rules
f the transmission management regime on short-run market
utcomes, i.e., for ﬁxed generation and transmission facilities.
rominent articles include Hogan (1999) , Ehrenmann and Smeers
20 05) , Neuhoff et al. (20 05) , Green (20 07) , or Ehrenmann and
euhoff (2009) who compare the short-run implications of zonal
ystems with redispatch to the system of nodal pricing. Several
rticles analyze the incentives of different agents that are able
o exercise market power under different transmission man-
gement regimes; see, e.g., Oren (1997) , Jing-Yuan and Smeers
1999) , Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft (1997) , Metzler, Hobbs, and
ang (2003) , Gilbert, Neuhoff, and Newbery (2004) , or Hu and
alph (2007) . Recently, Holmberg and Lazarczyk (2012) , Oggioni
nd Smeers (2013) , Oggioni, Smeers, Allevi, and Schaible (2012) ,
nd Perninge and Söder (2014) compared different transmission
anagement regimes based on market coupling or splitting with
edispatch. All those articles consider only the short-run perspec-
ive, while it is our purpose to consider the long-run effects on
nvestment incentives. 
.2. Outline of the paper 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ba-
ic economical and technical quantities that are used throughout
he paper. In Section 3 we introduce the integrated planner ap-
roach, while Section 4 presents the trilevel model with a cost-
ased redispatch system and market splitting. The trilevel model
s reformulated using novel ideas in Section 5 and tailored solu-
ion strategies for the reformulated model are given in Section 6 .
he penultimate part of the paper, Section 7 , presents computa-
ional results for test networks that illustrate the applicability of
ur model. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
. Basic economic and technical setup 
In this section we present the basic notation that is used
hroughout the paper. 
.1. Network model 
We consider an electricity transmission network G = (N, L ex )
ith a set of nodes N = { n 1 , . . . , n | N| } and a set of existing trans-
ission lines L ex . The lines l are characterized by their capacity f¯ l 
nd their susceptance B l . Given these data, the transmission sys-
em operator decides on an optimal network expansion plan, i.e.,
n the construction of candidate power lines l ∈ L new and on the
egradation of existing lines l ∈ L ex . The set of all lines, i.e., exist-
ng and candidate transmission lines, is denoted by L : = L ex ∪ L new .
or ˜ L ⊆ L and ˜ N ⊆ N we denote by 
δin ˜ N ( ˜
 L ) : = { l ∈ ˜ L : l = (n, m ) , n / ∈ ˜ N , m ∈ ˜ N } , 
out 
˜ ( ˜ L ) : = { l ∈ ˜ L : l = (n, m ) , n ∈ ˜ N , m / ∈ ˜ N } N he set of ingoing and outgoing lines of the node set ˜ N . 
Our trilevel power market model allows us to account for mul-
iple price zones Z = { Z 1 , . . . , Z | Z| } that form a partition of the node
et N = Z 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Z | Z| . In our context, the parts of this partition re-
er to different price zones in the electricity market. By L inter we
enote inter-zone lines connecting nodes that belong to different
ones. 
Line investment costs are denoted by c inv 
l 
and line degradation
ost by c 
deg 
l 
. When making line investment decisions, the TSO faces
hysical network constraints known as Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst and second
aw. Throughout the paper we use a linear approximation of real
ower ﬂows known as the lossless direct current (DC) power ﬂow
pproximation; see, e.g., Kirschen and Strbac (2004) . 
.2. Time horizon and electricity demand 
We assume a given equidistantly discretized time horizon T =
 t 1 , . . . , t | T | } with time steps τ = t k +1 − t k for all k = 1 , . . . , | T | − 1 .
oreover, the set of demand nodes is denoted by N dem ⊆ N. Con-
umers are located exclusively at these nodes, i.e., demand in every
ime period is zero at any other node n ∈ N \ N dem . Elastic demand
t demand node n ∈ N dem in time period t ∈ T is modeled by a
ontinuous, strictly decreasing function 
p t,n (d t,n ) : [0 , d¯ t,n ] → R + . 
Here and in what follows, d t,n denotes demand and p t,n ( d t,n ) is
he resulting market price. The saturation point d¯ t,n is the unique
ositive root of p t,n . Note that the gross consumer surplus, which is
he integral of p t,n over [0 , d¯ t,n ] , is a concave function in our case. 
.3. Investment, production, and supply 
For a given network node n ∈ N , G all n denotes a ﬁnite set of ex-
sting technologies and candidate technologies that ﬁrms can in-
est in. We use the set G ex n for already existing generation tech-
ologies and the set G new n for candidate generation technologies.
hus, G all n = G new n ∪ G ex n holds. To account for the characteristics of
ifferent production technologies, we allow for so-called equivalent
vailabilities αg ∈ [0, 1] for every g ∈ G all n and n ∈ N . Investment
ost of building new generation capacity is denoted by c inv g ∈ R + . 
We assume that all ﬁrms act in a competitive environment
ithout any type of market power and act as price takers; see
lso Section 4.2 . Variable production cost is denoted by c var g ∈ R + 
or all g ∈ G all n and n ∈ N . In addition, we assume that all variable
osts c var g are pairwise distinct to ensure unique spot market solu-
ions; see Section 5 . 
.4. Network fees 
In our power market model the TSO has to collect network fees
n order to cover expenses arising from line investment and redis-
atch. We denote the revenues from these network fees by R and
onsider three different types of network fee regimes: 
• We denote by ϕ ls the lump sum fee that is paid by the con-
sumers. The corresponding revenues are given by R ls = ϕ ls . 
• We denote by ϕ eb the energy based fee, i.e., a per-unit fee
charged for each unit of electricity traded on the spot market.
Let d 
spot 
t,n describe spot market demand at node n in time pe-
riod t . Then, the corresponding revenue is given by 
R eb = ϕ eb 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
d spot t,n . 
• We denote by ϕ gcb the generation capacity based fee, i.e., a per-
unit fee charged for each unit of generation capacity connected
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Table 1 
Variables and derived quantities. 
Symbol Description Unit 
d t,n Demand at demand node n ∈ N dem in time period t Megawatt hour 
p t,n Price function at demand node n ∈ N dem in time period t Dollars per megawatt hour 
θ t,n Voltage angle at node n ∈ N in time period t Radian 
f t,l Power ﬂow on line l ∈ L ex ∪ L new in time period t Megawatt hour 
y t,g Power generation of generator g ∈ G all n Megawatt hour 
y¯ new g New power generation capacity installed of generator g ∈ G new n Megawatt 
z new 
l 
Decision variable for building line l ∈ L new Dimensionless 
z ex 
l 
Decision variable for degrading line l ∈ L ex Dimensionless 
E Expenses of the transmission system operator Dollars 
R Revenues of the transmission system operator Dollars 
ϕ ls Lump sum fee Dollars 
ϕ eb Energy based per-unit fee Dollars per megawatt hour 
ϕ gcb Generation capacity based per-unit fee Dollars per megawatt 
Table 2 
Parameters. 
Symbol Description Unit 
G Transmission network Dimensionless 
N Set of nodes of the transmission network Dimensionless 
N dem Set of demand nodes Dimensionless 
T Set of time periods Dimensionless 
Z Set of zones for market splitting Dimensionless 
G all n Set of all generation technologies at node n ∈ N Dimensionless 
G ex n Set of existing generation technologies at node n ∈ N Dimensionless 
G new n Set of candidate generation technologies at node n ∈ N Dimensionless 
L ex Set of all existing transmission lines (set of arcs of graph G) Dimensionless 
L new Set of all candidate transmission lines Dimensionless 
L inter Set of all inter-zone transmission lines Dimensionless 
s n Slope of p t,n at demand node n ∈ N dem Dollars per megawatt hour squared 
a t,n Intercept of p t,n at demand node n ∈ N dem in time period t Dollars per megawatt hour 
c inv g Investment cost of candidate generation technology g ∈ G new n Dollars per megawatt 
c var g Variable cost of generation technology g ∈ G all n Dollars per megawatt hour 
c inv 
l 
Investment cost of candidate transmission line l ∈ L new Dollars 
c deg 
l 
Degradation cost of existing transmission line l ∈ L ex Dollars 
y¯ ex g Power generation capacity of generator g ∈ G ex n megawatt 
f¯ l Maximum power ﬂow on line l ∈ L ex ∪ L new megawatt hour 
B l DC-power-ﬂow-scaled susceptance of line l ∈ L ex ∪ L new megawatt hour 
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ψto the network. If y¯ ex g denotes the capacity of an existing gen-
erator and y¯ new g the capacity of a newly installed generator, the
corresponding revenues are 
R gcb = ϕ gcb 
∑ 
n ∈ N 
( ∑ 
g∈ G new n 
y¯ new g + 
∑ 
g∈ G ex n 
y¯ ex g 
) 
. 
Let us brieﬂy justify the choice of the different network fees.
We consider a lump sum fee as a theoretical benchmark that does
not directly affect investment decisions for generation capacity. We
are aware that, in practice, network fee regimes typically combine
energy based and capacity based components. In order to provide
insights on how the network fee regime affects investment incen-
tives and welfare, we consider the extreme cases of an energy
based and a purely capacity based network fee. The model can
be extended to capture hybrid fees if it is applied to a particular
market. Our approach allows to illustrate how the effect of differ-
ent network fee regimes on optimal capacity investment translates
into welfare effects. 
For the sake of completeness, we present all quantities used in
our models in Tables 1 and 2 . . The integrated planner approach as a ﬁrst best benchmark 
As a ﬁrst best benchmark we consider the integrated planner
pproach where an integrated generation and transmission com-
any (IGTC) simultaneously decides on transmission and genera-
ion capacity expansion and chooses welfare maximizing produc-
ion at the spot markets. There are several formulations in the
iterature that analyze integrated planner solutions, which might
erve as a benchmark in our setting. The formulation chosen here
s closely related to the formulation of the integrated planner
odel in Jenabi et al. (2013) . The IGTC maximizes total social wel-
are, which is deﬁned as the difference of gross consumer surplus
aggregated over all demand scenarios) and line investment cost,
ine degradation cost, as well as generation capacity investment
ost and variable cost of production. Thus, the objective function
f the IGTC reads 
 IGTC : = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x −
∑ 
l∈ L new 
c inv l z 
new 
l −
∑ 
l∈ L ex 
c deg 
l 
z ex l 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N 
( ∑ 
g∈ G new n 
c inv g y¯ 
new 
g + 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var g y t,g 
) 
, 
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supplyhere z new 
l 
and z ex 
l 
are binary decision variables that decide
hether a new line is built or an existing line is degraded. More-
ver, y t,g is the actual production of generation technology g at
ode n . It can be shown that this approach yields the same invest-
ent and production outcomes as an idealized nodal pricing sys-
em. 2 In what follows, we introduce the constraints that the IGTC
s facing. Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst law ensures power balance at every node
 ∈ N in the electricity network. Thus, for every time period t ∈ T
he power ﬂow out of node n ∈ N and the power ﬂow into that
ode have to be balanced with respect to total production and de-
and at that node: 
 t,n = 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
y t,g + 
∑ 
l∈ δin n (L ) 
f t,l −
∑ 
l∈ δout n (L ) 
f t,l for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T . (1)
Note that summing up (1) for all network nodes yields the mar-
et clearing condition ∑ 
 ∈ N dem 
d t,n = 
∑ 
n ∈ N 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
y t,g for all t ∈ T . (2)
Kirchhoff’s second law determines the voltage angles θ t,n ,
 ∈ N , t ∈ T , in the network: 
M l z 
ex 
l ≤ f t,l − B l (θt,n − θt,m ) ≤ M l z ex l for all 
l = (n, m ) ∈ L ex , t ∈ T , (3a) 
M l (1 − z new l ) ≤ f t,l − B l (θt,n − θt,m ) ≤ M l (1 − z new l ) for all 
l = (n, m ) ∈ L new , t ∈ T , (3b) 
here M denotes a suﬃciently large constant. In order to obtain
hysically unique solutions, we have to ﬁx the voltage angle at an
rbitrary reference node n 1 ∈ N in every time period: 
t,n 1 = 0 for all t ∈ T . (4)
Furthermore, transmission ﬂows are limited by lower and upper
ounds. Here, line investment is explicitly taken into account: 
(1 − z ex l ) ¯f l ≤ f t,l ≤ (1 − z ex l ) ¯f l for all l ∈ L ex , t ∈ T , (5a) 
z new l f¯ l ≤ f t,l ≤ z new l f¯ l for all l ∈ L new , t ∈ T . (5b) 
The next group of constraints ensures that electricity produc-
ion does not exceed installed generation capacity with respect to
he equivalent availabilities of the considered technologies: 
 t,g ≤ αg τ y¯ ex g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G ex n , t ∈ T , (6a) 
 t,g ≤ αg τ y¯ new g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G new n , t ∈ T . (6b) 
Note that generation capacity is denoted in MW while actual
roduction is given in MWh. This is the reason why we have
o multiply the right-hand sides with the time step τ . Finally,
e have to impose simple bounds on the variables of the ITGC
odel: 
¯
 
new 
g ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G new n , (7a) 
 t,g ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G all n , t ∈ T , (7b) 
 t,n ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N dem , t ∈ T , (7c) 2 It is well-known that the integrated planner approach yields the same outcome 
s a nodal price system in the short-run; see, e.g., Hogan (2002) . Analogously, our 
esults in Section 5 imply that the solution of the long-run integrated planner ap- 
roach is equivalent to the outcome of a trilevel nodal pricing model which also 
ccounts for investments in transmission and generation capacity. In such a trilevel 
odal pricing model, a regulated TSO decides on transmission expansion in the ﬁrst 
evel. At the second level, competitive ﬁrms decide on generation expansion invest- 
ent and spot market bids. At the third level, the TSO decides on the welfare max- 
mizing feasible allocation and implements nodal prices.  
ex 
l ∈ { 0 , 1 } for all l ∈ L ex , (7d) 
 
new 
l ∈ { 0 , 1 } for all l ∈ L new . (7e) 
In summary, the IGTC faces the following inter-temporal mixed-
nteger maximization problem with linear constraints and a con-
ave objective function: 
ax ψ IGTC (8a) 
.t. Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst and second law: (1) , (3) , (8b) 
voltage phase angle at reference node: (4) , (8c) 
transmission ﬂow limits: (5) , (8d) 
generation capacity limits: (6) , (8e) 
variable restrictions: (7) . (8f) 
We ﬁnally note that it might also be possible to incorporate ad-
itional security of supply constraints, both for line and generation
nvestment. However, we neglect this aspect here and in what fol-
ows for the ease of presentation. 
. The trilevel power market model 
In most European countries spot market trading does not fully
ccount for network constraints (if at all). Therefore, congestion
anagement mechanisms and the way network fees are collected
lay a crucial role for investment incentives—both in network and
eneration capacity expansion. It is most likely that energy-only
arkets with redispatch do not result in optimal incentive struc-
ures. Thus, one is faced with two main questions: How large is
he difference to the ﬁrst best solution and do there exist alterna-
ive mechanisms that have the capability to improve the situation
ubstantially? 
In our power market model we consider an energy-only mar-
et with cost-based redispatch. Electricity trading and redispatch
s organized as follows in such a system: Firms trade electricity
ay ahead (and possibly intra-day) at a power exchange that does
ot account for any transmission constraints—or at least not for all
f them as in the case of market splitting. After closing the market,
he TSO checks feasibility of the resulting transmission ﬂows. If the
llocation is feasible, nothing is changed and electricity is gener-
ted and consumed as traded. If transmission is infeasible, the TSO
edispatches plants and consumers in the cheapest possible way
hat ensures feasibility of transmission ﬂows. To that aim the TSO
bliges some producers to (partially) shut down production, while
thers are called to step in instead, or asks consumers to modifyquantity
BD
E
demand
Fig. 1. Economic equilibrium of cost-based redispatch. 
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t
line expansion
(TSO)
generation capacity
expansion (firms)
|T | periods of spot market
trading (firms) and redispatch
after each spot market (TSO)
Fig. 2. Timing of the multilevel game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
max social welfare (TSO)
s.t. budget equilibrium
line investment constraints
max firms’ profits/social welfare (firms)
s.t. generation investment
production constraints
Kirchhoff ’s 1st law (inter-zonal)
flow restrictions (inter-zonal)
min redispatch costs (TSO)
s.t. production constraints
market clearing condition
power flow constraints
Fig. 3. The trilevel market model. 
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j  their demand. Plants that are shut down have to pay their vari-
able cost, which they save due to the shutdown, to the TSO. Plants
that are called to step in receive their variable production cost.
Production cost of the called plants are necessarily higher than
production cost of the plants that are shut down, since otherwise
they would have been successful on the spot market. The resulting
cost is collected by the TSO through network fees. While in the
early days of liberalized electricity markets redispatch was a rare
event, nowadays the phenomenon becomes more and more im-
portant. See, e.g., ENTSO-E (2012a) for the case of Germany, where
the decision to shut down nuclear power plants and to increase
the generation capacity of renewables implies a much more un-
certain and regionally dispersed supply structure. Fig. 1 illustrates
the cost-based redispatch mechanism on a stylized two-node ex-
ample. Here, linear demand is located at one node and produc-
tion is hosted at the other node. We further assume that there is
only one generator with constant variable production cost. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1 , in the case of unlimited transmission capacities the
equilibrium quantity B will be produced. However, given physical
transmission constraints with D describing the maximum amount
of electricity that can be transmitted between the two nodes, the
TSO obliges consumers to step back from their contracts. As a com-
pensation, the TSO pays these consumers the amount equal to the
area of the polygon ABDF . Additionally, the TSO asks ﬁrms (typi-
cally those with the highest variable cost) to shut down their pro-
duction. The respective ﬁrms pay an amount equal to the area of
the rectangle ABDE to the TSO, which corresponds exactly to the
variable cost that do not arise due to redispatch. Obviously, the re-
dispatch mechanism has no impact on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts when they
are asked to decrease their production. In contrast, the TSO faces
additional cost equal to the area of the triangle AEF . These addi-
tional cost must be collected from the market participants through
network fees. 
Let us now brieﬂy sketch how we capture the described
market/non-market environment in the structure of a trilevel
model before we introduce the details at all levels and our solu-
tion strategy. 
The timing of the situation we want to capture is illustrated in
Fig. 2 . Note that investment choices are taken once (sequentially
by the TSO and competitive ﬁrms), followed by multiple periods
of spot market trading and redispatch (in the case of congestion).
We translate this game into a trilevel model as follows: At the ﬁrst
level, the TSO decides to invest in line expansion or degradation,
anticipating the outcomes at all subsequent levels. The objective of
the TSO is to maximize welfare. 3 Now consider the multiple pe-
riods of spot market trading and redispatch. Note that there are3 In liberalized electricity markets, regulated monopolists operate the networks 
and maximize their proﬁts. Ideally, the regulatory environment (in particular the 
possibility to recover investment costs through network fees) should be set up as 
to induce the TSO to maximize welfare. We are aware that in practice incomplete 
information hinders the regulator to achieve this goal. Our assumption therefore 
reﬂects the ideal case that regulation works perfectly. In many states the authorities 
try to address the issue also by means beyond traditional incentive regulation. In 
Germany, for example, network expansion plans are developed and revised on a 
bi-annual basis in a joint activity among all TSOs and the regulatory authority. The 
t
 
t  
t  
U  
s
s
ao interdependencies between the different subsequent spot mar-
ets (due to non-storability of the product). Thus, we can solve the
edispatch problems jointly in a separate level of the problem at
he very end (third level). The redispatch that takes place after the
 T | spot markets is anticipated by ﬁrms when they decide on in-
estment and supply. In case of cost-based redispatch, ﬁrms do not
nticipate further proﬁts, which enables us to simplify the problem
urther (see Section 5 ). The current formulation also allows to cap-
ure alternative redispatch mechanisms. 
At the second level, we model investment decisions of private
rms in generation capacity as well as trading at a sequence of
 T | spot markets with ﬂuctuating demand. We can consider invest-
ent and production jointly since the decisions are taken by the
ame decision maker. In contrast to the TSO who is driven by wel-
are concerns (or regulated such that it is in his own interest to
aximize welfare), ﬁrms take investment and supply decisions as
o maximize proﬁts. This is due to the fact that in liberalized elec-
ricity markets generation investment and electricity production is
ecided on by private ﬁrms. We assume that spot market rules
ield a uniform price within a price zone and assume that spot
arkets are competitive (see Section 4.2 for a detailed discussion
f the latter assumption). 
We point out that all levels of our power market model are in-
erconnected: the investment of ﬁrms and optimal spot market be-
avior as well as the redispatch market are part of the TSO’s ob-
ective and constraints at the ﬁrst level. We graphically illustrate
he trilevel problem that we analyze in the following in Fig. 3 . 
Let us ﬁnally emphasize that our power market model allows
o account for multiple price zones Z , which enables us to inves-
igate the effect of market splitting under cost-based redispatch.
nder market splitting, spot market trading takes network con-
traints between, but not within, zones into account. o-called NEP (Netzentwicklungsplan–Network Development Plan) is consulted with 
ll stakeholders every two years. 
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4 Note that analogous to ﬂow-based market coupling, we could also consider 
Kirchhoff’s second law on the reduced network among zones. Our framework would 
be perfectly suited for such an analysis. However, due to the overall length of this 
article we refrain from this aspect. .1. First-level problem: optimal line expansion 
In order to formally state the models, we have to introduce
ome more notation. In what follows, a superindex “spot” indi-
ates quantities after spot market trading and a superindex “redi”
enotes quantities after redispatch. Lastly, ’s denote redispatch
uantities, i.e., the difference of the quantity after redispatch and
fter spot market trading. For instance, d redi t,n = d spot t,n + d t,n spec-
ﬁes the relationship between demand after spot market trading
nd the actual demand after redispatch. 
At the ﬁrst level, the TSO decides on a line expansion plan as
o maximize welfare, which is given as the difference of gross con-
umer surplus from all markets and investment and generation
osts: 
 1 : = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d redi t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x −
∑ 
l∈ L new 
c inv l z 
new 
l −
∑ 
l∈ L ex 
c deg 
l 
z ex l 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N 
( ∑ 
g∈ G new n 
c inv g y¯ 
new 
g + 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var g y 
redi 
t,g 
) 
. (9) 
The TSO is restricted by the budget constraint E = R requiring
hat expenses 
 = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d spot t,n 
d redi t,n 
p t,n (x ) d x + 
∑ 
n ∈ N 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var g y t,g 
+ 
∑ 
l∈ L new 
c inv l z 
new 
l + 
∑ 
l∈ L ex 
c deg 
l 
z ex l (10) 
or network expansion and degradation (third and fourth term)
nd redispatch (ﬁrst and second term) are covered by revenues R
rom network fees ϕ; cf. Section 2.4 . Thus, revenues R are a func-
ion of the collected fee ϕ, which makes the latter a ﬁrst-level
ariable. Note that redispatch cost is composed of remuneration
f consumers that cannot be supplied (ﬁrst term) as well as trans-
ers to (or from) plants that are redispatched (second term). As the
SO can decide to reduce spot market production or demand, y t,g 
nd d t,n may also become negative. All together, we obtain the
ollowing ﬁrst-level problem: 
ax ψ 1 
s.t. E = R, z new l ∈ { 0 , 1 } for all l ∈ L new , 
z ex l ∈ { 0 , 1 } for all l ∈ L ex . 
.2. Second-level problem: generation investment and spot market 
ehavior 
At the second level we model the behavior of ﬁrms with respect
o generation investment and spot market trading. The wholesale
lectricity market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, i.e., no
rm can directly affect prices by strategic investment or supply
ecisions. It has been shown in the literature that in the absence
f transmission constraints a perfectly competitive environment
ields welfare maximizing investment and production decisions in
ur context; see, e.g., Grimm and Zöttl (2013) . This implies that we
dentify the competitive investment and production decisions of
he generators by solving the corresponding welfare maximization
roblem. We are aware of the issue that the assumption of perfect
ompetition may not be adequate for power systems in general.
owever, this assumption is necessary in order to keep the mul-
ilevel problem tractable, both theoretically and computationally:
or the case of strategic ﬁrms investing in several technologies, it
as been shown that uniqueness of equilibria does not hold for a
easonable set of assumptions; see Zöttl (2010) . As a consequence,
his assumption has been established as a standard in the litera-
ure; see, e.g., Boucher and Smeers (2001) or Daxhelet and Smeers
2007) . When making investment and supply decisions, ﬁrms only con-
ider physical constraints for which they receive price signals. If
he market is not divided into zones, ﬁrms receive no signals con-
erning network capacities and thus will not account for them. If
he market is divided into two or more zones, ﬁrms consider those
hysical constraints, which are expressed in price differences due
o market splitting: Between any pair of zones, electricity ﬂow can-
ot exceed the maximum capacity of the respective inter-zone net-
ork links—and congestion implies price differences across zones.
his is modeled by the following zonal version of Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst
aw ∑ 
 ∈ N dem ∩ Z k 
d spot t,n = 
∑ 
n ∈ N∩ Z k 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
y spot t,g + 
∑ 
l∈ δin 
Z k 
(L ) 
f spot 
t,l 
−
∑ 
l∈ δout 
Z k 
(L ) 
f spot 
t,l 
(11)
or all t ∈ T , Z k ∈ Z , and market splitting ﬂow restrictions 
(1 − z ex l ) ¯f l ≤ f spot t,l ≤ (1 − z ex l ) ¯f l for all l ∈ L inter ∩ L ex , t ∈ T , 
(12a) 
z new l f¯ l ≤ f spot t,l ≤ z new l f¯ l for all l ∈ L inter ∩ L new , t ∈ T . (12b) 
Other physical restrictions like Kirchhoff’s second law are not
onsidered. 4 In addition, we have variable restrictions in analogy
o (7) , i.e., 
¯
 
new 
g ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G new n , (13a) 
 
spot 
t,g ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G all n , t ∈ T , (13b) 
 
spot 
t,n ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N dem , t ∈ T . (13c) 
To summarize, at level two we consider welfare maximizing
eneration investment and supply decisions, i.e., 
 2 : = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d spot t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N 
( ∑ 
g∈ G new n 
c inv g y¯ 
new 
g + 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var g y 
spot 
t,g 
) 
− R, (14) 
here supply is constrained by generation capacities installed and
ransmission constraints across zones. Note that in (14) , R again
enotes revenues of the TSO, which affect demand and genera-
ion decisions on the spot market. Thus, the second-level problem
eads 
ax ψ 2 
s.t. generation capacity limits: (6) , 
zonal version of Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst law: (11) , 
market splitting ﬂow restrictions: (12) , 
variable restrictions: (13) , 
here we replaced y t , g by y 
spot 
t,g in (6) . 
We ﬁnally point to the following observations regarding the
onal version of Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst law: Summing up (11) for all zones
e obtain the market clearing condition (2) . In a model with re-
ispatch and only one zone, (11) coincides with a standard market
learing condition. In the case where every zone consists of ex-
ctly one network node, (11) coincides with Kirchhoff’s ﬁrst law
nsuring power balance at every network node. Intermediate cases
equire the market to clear within each zone, accounting for pos-
ible transmission constraints across zones through differences in
he respective market clearing prices. 
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Table 3 
Variables of the trilevel model. 
First-level variables: z ex 
l 
, z new 
l 
, ϕ
Second-level variables d spot t,n , y 
spot 
t,g , f 
spot 
t,l 
, ¯y new g 
Third-level variables d redi t,n , y 
redi 
t,g , f 
redi 
t,l 
, θ redi 
t,l 
, y t,g , d t,n ,  f t,l 
Multilevel variables E , R 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Reformulated trilevel problem: sub- and master problem. 
Subproblem Master problem 
(generation investment and spot market) (line expansion and redispatch) 
max ﬁrms’ proﬁts/social welfare max social welfare 
s.t. a) generation investment s.t. a) line investment 
b) production constraints b) production constraints 
c) Kirchhoff’s 1st law (inter-zonal) c) power ﬂow constraints 
d) ﬂow restrictions (inter-zonal) d) revenue/network fee 
e) revenue/network fee 
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i4.3. Third-level problem: optimal redispatch 
At the third level, the TSO simultaneously decides on redispatch
for all | T | spot markets. Reallocation of spot market outcomes is re-
alized in a way that ensures feasibility with respect to transmission
constraints at lowest costs. These costs are given by 
ψ 3 : = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d spot t,n 
d redi t,n 
p t,n (x ) d x + 
∑ 
n ∈ N 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var g y t,g 
and the redispatch decision has to account for all physical trans-
mission constraints and generation capacity limits: 
min ψ 3 
s.t. d redi t,n = 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
y redi t,g + 
∑ 
l∈ δin n (L ) 
f redi t,l −
∑ 
l∈ δout n (L ) 
f redi t,l for all 
n ∈ N, t ∈ T . 
− M l z ex l ≤ f redi t,l − B l (θt,n − θt,m ) ≤ M l z ex l for all 
l = (n, m ) ∈ L ex , t ∈ T , 
− M l (1 − z new l ) ≤ f redi t,l − B l (θt,n − θt,m ) ≤ M l (1 − z new l ) 
for all l = (n, m ) ∈ L new , t ∈ T , 
θt,n 1 = 0 for all t ∈ T , 
− (1 − z ex l ) ¯f l ≤ f redi t,l ≤ (1 − z ex l ) ¯f l for all l ∈ L ex , t ∈ T , 
− z new l f¯ l ≤ f redi t,l ≤ z new l f¯ l for all l ∈ L new , t ∈ T , 
y redi t,g ≤ αg τ y¯ ex g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G ex n , t ∈ T , 
y redi t,g ≤ αg τ y¯ new g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G new n , t ∈ T , 
d redi t,n = d spot t,n + d t,n for all n ∈ N dem , t ∈ T , 
y redi t,g = y spot t,g + y t,g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G all n , t ∈ T , 
f redi t,l = f spot t,l +  f t,l for all l ∈ L inter , t ∈ T , 
d redi t,n ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N dem , t ∈ T , 
y redi t,g ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ G all n , t ∈ T . 
Observe that the trilevel problem yields a different solution
than the integrated planner problem. This is mainly driven by the
fact that ﬁrms at the second level choose generation capacities,
which are not optimal from an overall welfare maximizing per-
spective, since their choice ignores network congestion. Welfare
obtained for the solution of the integrated planner problem is thus
larger than welfare obtained for the solution of the trilevel market
problem. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the variables of all three levels. 
5. Reformulation of the trilevel model 
The trilevel problem developed in the last section is a spe-
cial instance of general multilevel optimization problems, which
is a very hard class of optimization problems; cf. Jeroslow (1985) ,
who showed that even solving linear bilevel problems is NP-hard.
Most algorithmic approaches for bilevel problems make use of
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions and solve the resulting mathe-
matical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC); see Hobbs
(1998) , Jenabi et al. (2013) , or Jin and Ryan (2011) for appliedtudies. However, such problem reformulations explicitly rely on
onconvex optimization problems and additionally have the draw-
ack that standard constraint qualiﬁcations like the Mangasarian–
romovitz constraint qualiﬁcation are violated at every feasible
oint. Therefore, problem tailored constraint qualiﬁcations and sta-
ionarity concepts have been developed for MPECs; see, e.g., Scheel
nd Scholtes (20 0 0) . For more information on the topic of multi-
evel optimization and MPECs we refer to Cottle, Pang, and Stone
2009) , Dempe (2002) , and Luo, Pang, and Ralph (1996) . 
In this section we present a new reformulation approach that
llows us to ﬁnd global optimal solutions in our speciﬁc case with-
ut using ﬁrst-order optimality conditions. Before we present our
eformulation approach, we point out that the trilevel problem al-
ays has a ﬁnite global optimal solution, since the feasible region
s bounded. 
The main reason that makes a reduction of levels of the trilevel
odel possible is that the objective functions all point “into the
ame direction”. This aspect and the way how we exploit it is
iscussed in detail in the following. Our reformulation approach
uilds on a two-step analysis of the connection between the three
roblem levels. In a ﬁrst step, we ﬁx all non-second-level variables
n the second-level problem. This allows us to iteratively solve
ndependent single-level subproblems, i.e., second-level problems
ith respect to given line investment, and corresponding bilevel
aster problems consisting of the original ﬁrst- and third-level
odels. In a second step, we show that instead of solving a bilevel
aster problem, we can solve a single-level master problem. Com-
ining the results of both steps, we iteratively solve single-level
ub- and master problems arriving at a global optimal solution to
he original trilevel problem. Table 4 depicts the reformulation of
he trilevel problem into single-level sub- and master problems. 
.1. From the trilevel problem to a single-level sub- and bilevel 
aster problem 
First note that the second-level problem (generation invest-
ent and spot market behavior) includes only ﬁrst- and second-
evel variables. The reason is that for cost-based redispatch ﬁrms
ever receive additional rents from the third level. Consequently,
lthough the second-level problem is connected to the third level
redispatch) via the line investment problem at the ﬁrst level, there
s no direct interconnection. To be more precise, the interconnec-
ion of the levels is purely driven by inter-zonal line investment
ariables and the network fee variable from the ﬁrst-level problem.
hus, we can ﬁx these variables and solve the second-level market
ubproblem for every possible realization of these variables. We
hen ﬁx the respective second-level variables in the ﬁrst-level and
he third-level problem to the values of this solution. This reduces
he problem to a bilevel master problem with a reduced number of
ariables. Note that the approach to substitute the optimal second-
evel values requires uniqueness of the second-level solution. This
s shown in Grimm, Schewe, Schmidt, and Zöttl (2015b) . 
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e  .2. From a bilevel to a single-level master problem 
We now show how the bilevel master problem consisting of
ine investment and redispatch can be solved eﬃciently. The key
ngredient is given in the following proposition, which states that
he third-level objective ψ 3 is an aﬃne transformation of the ob-
ective ψ 1 of the ﬁrst level. 
roposition 1. Let ψ 1 and ψ 3 be the objective functions of the orig-
nal ﬁrst and third level. Then, ψ 3 = −ψ 1 + b holds, where 
 = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d spot t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x −
∑ 
l∈ L new 
c inv l z 
new 
l −
∑ 
l∈ L ex 
c deg 
l 
z ex l 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N 
∑ 
g∈ G new n 
c inv g y¯ 
new 
g −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
∑ 
g∈ G all n 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var g y 
spot 
t,g 
nly depends on spot market and line investment variables. 
This insight reveals that the ﬁrst- and third-level problem have
ﬃne equivalent objective functions and thus have identical opti-
ization directions. We remark that the latter proposition is the
athematical consequence of the economical discussion of our
arket model in Section 4 . Next, we exploit the fact that, in
rder to solve a general bilevel problem with aﬃne equivalent
bjective functions, it is possible to solve an easier single-level
roblem. 
roposition 2. Consider the bilevel problem 
min 
x 1 ,x 2 
ψ(x 1 , x 2 ) s.t. g(x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 , 
x 2 = arg min 
z 
{ ψ(x 1 , z) : h (x 1 , z) ≥ 0 } 
ith equivalent objective functions in the upper and lower level and
enote the set of optimal solutions by S bl . Moreover, let 
in 
x 1 ,x 2 
ψ(x 1 , x 2 ) s.t. g(x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 , h (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 
e the corresponding single-level problem with solution set S sl . Then,
 
sl = S bl holds. 
roof. Since a solution of the bilevel problem is feasible for the
ingle-level problem and vice versa, the same objective function in
he upper and lower level directly implies the result. 
Note that the above result can easily be generalized to p -level
ptimization problems for p > 2. For the sake of completeness let
s also state the following proposition, which is an immediate con-
equence. 
roposition 3. Assume a p-level minimization problem is given with
 i denoting the objective function of the ith level of the problem. If
here exist aﬃne linear transformations a i ψ i + b i = ψ 1 and a i > 0 for
ll i ∈ { 2 , . . . , p} , then the multilevel model can be solved as a single-
evel model. 
Note that the condition a i ψ i + b i = ψ 1 is obviously satisﬁed if
 i ψ i + b i = ψ i −1 holds for all i ∈ { 2 , . . . , p} . 
We ﬁnally remark that Proposition 1 directly ﬁts into the set-
ing of the last proposition since we maximize in the ﬁrst and
inimize in the third level, which is the reason for the sign con-
ersion. 
. Solution strategy 
In this section we describe how we solve the reformulated
roblem to global optimality. Since we started from a mixed-
nteger nonlinear trilevel problem it is clear that this is computa-
ionally a very hard task. However, the reformulation discussed in
ection 5 , together with the results given in this section, allows uso set up a binary search strategy to solve the coupled master and
ubproblems; see Section 6.1 . In Section 6.2 , we describe how bi-
ary search upper bounds for the network fee are determined and
n Section 6.3 , we describe a technique for reducing the complexity
f the proposed algorithm. 
.1. Binary search algorithm 
We now describe how the trilevel problem can be solved in an
ﬃcient way using a problem tailored binary search strategy. This
pproach is based on the trilevel problem reformulated as a single-
evel sub- and master problem as described in Section 5 . The key
nsight is that the master and subproblem are only coupled by
ransmission line investment and network fees. Thus, ﬁxing these
alues yields decoupled models that can be solved separately. For
his purpose, we iterate over all possible network conﬁgurations X 
ith ∅ ⊆ X ⊆ L ex ∪ L new and additionally neglect the budget con-
traint μ = R − E = 0 , for which we compute the unique feasible
olution via binary search. The resulting algorithm is depicted in
lgorithm 1 . 
Algorithm 1: Binary search for the reformulated trilevel 
model. 
Input : Parameters for the trilevel power market 
model,upper bound ϕ¯ of the network fee 
Output : Optimal solution ˆ x and optimal objective value ˆ ψ of 
the trilevel problem 
1 Set ˆ ψ = 0 and ˆ x = 0 . 
2 for all network conﬁgurations ∅ ⊆ X ⊆ L ex ∪ L new do 
3 Set a ← 0 and b ← ϕ¯ . 
4 while a ≤ b do 
5 Set ϕ ← (a + b) / 2 and solve the subproblem forﬁxed 
network conﬁguration X and ﬁxed networkfee ϕ.Let 
ˆ yX ,ϕ be the solution. 
6 Solve the master problem for ﬁxed 
networkconﬁguration X , ﬁxed network fee ϕ, and ﬁxed 
values ˆ  yX ,ϕ of the subproblem .Let ˆ xX ,ϕ be the solution. 
7 if | μ( ˆ  xX ,ϕ ) | = 0 then go to line 9 
8 if μ( ˆ  xX ,ϕ ) < 0 then set a ← ϕ else set b ← ϕ. 
9 if ψ( ˆ  xX ,ϕ ) > ˆ ψ then set ˆ x ← ˆ xX ,ϕ and ˆ ψ ← ψ( ˆ  x) . 
10 return ˆ x and ˆ ψ . 
In order to proof correctness of the algorithm, we have to show
hat the budget function μ = μ(ϕ) for ﬁxed line investment is
trictly increasing in the network fee ϕ and that sign (μ(0))  =
ign (μ( ¯ϕ )) . Note that correctness of the binary search algorithm
nly requires monotonicity of the budget function but strict mono-
onicity is required in order to obtain global optimal solutions.
ere and in what follows, ϕ¯ denotes the upper bound on the
etwork fee that is used in the binary search. Our discussion in
ection 4 shows that cost from redispatch are always nonnegative.
oreover, they can only be zero in the case of no line investment.
ince R (0) = 0 for every fee type, this shows μ(0) ≤ 0. Thus, it is
uﬃcient to prove strict monotonicity of μ since then μ( ¯ϕ ) > 0
ollows for suﬃciently large ϕ¯ . Obviously, there is nothing to show
or the case of a lump sum fee. In the next section, we prove a
riterion for strict monotonicity for the generation capacity based
ee ϕ = ϕ gcb and focus on the case of the energy based fee ϕ = ϕ eb 
n Section 6.1.2 . 
.1.1. Monotonicity of the TSO’s budget function for the generation 
apacity based fee 
In the following, quantities without a subindex for network
lements or time periods denote the corresponding vector, e.g.,
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t  y¯ new = ( ¯y new n ) n ∈ N is the vector of all newly installed generation ca-
pacities. Using this notation, the budget function μ : R → R is de-
ﬁned as 
μ(ϕ) : = R (ϕ, y¯ new (ϕ)) − E( ¯y new (ϕ)) . 
For the ease of exposition, we consider the slightly simpliﬁed
spot market model without market splitting 
max 
d,y, ¯y new 
ψ spot : = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N 
( 
c inv n y¯ 
new 
n + ϕ ¯y new n + 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var n y t,n 
) 
(15a)
s.t. 0 ≤ y t,n ≤ y¯ new n for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T , (15b)
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
d t,n −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
y t,n = 0 for all t ∈ T , (15c)
in which we (w.l.o.g.) assume that it can only be invested in one
technology per node, all equivalent availabilities are 1, and the
time steps τ are 1 hour. The corresponding redispatch model is
given by 
max 
d,y 
ψ redi : = 
∑ 
t∈ T 
( ∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∫ d t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
c var n y t,n 
) 
(16a)
s.t. 0 ≤ y t,n ≤ y¯ new n for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T , (16b)
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
d t,n −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
y t,n = 0 for all t ∈ T , (16c)
− f¯ ≤ A (d − y ) ≤ f¯ , (16d)
where A is the well-known PTDF matrix that relates demand and
production at nodes of an electricity network to power ﬂows on
lines. With these two models and the deﬁnition (10) of the TSO’s
expenses, the budget function can be rewritten as 
μ(ϕ) = ˆ ψ redi ( ¯y new (ϕ)) − ˆ ψ spot (ϕ) −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
c inv n y¯ 
new 
n (ϕ) , 
where only those dependencies on parameters are given that do
not vanish in the ﬁrst derivative w.r.t. ϕ. Strict monotonicity in ϕ 
is then equivalent to 
0 < 
d μ
d ϕ 
= (∇ y¯ new ˆ ψ redi ) T ∇ ϕ ¯y new −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
c inv n 
∂ ¯y new n 
∂ϕ 
+ 
∑ 
n ∈ N 
y¯ new n . (17)
Thus, we have to compute the change in generation investment
with respect to the network fee ∇ ϕ ¯y new and the change in the op-
timal redispatch value with respect to the upper bounds on gener-
ation ∇ y¯ new ˆ ψ redi . We start with the former and make use of the
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions of the spot market model (15) ,
which are also suﬃcient in our case. These conditions comprise
dual feasibility 
p t,n (d t,n ) + λt = 0 for all n ∈ N dem , t ∈ T , (18a)
−c var n + αt,n − βt,n − λt = 0 for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T , (18b)
−c inv n − ϕ + 
∑ 
t∈ T 
βt,n = 0 for all n ∈ N, (18c)
primal feasibility (15b) and (15c) as well as complementarity and
nonnegativity of dual variables of inequality constraints (15b) . Thats, the lower bounds 0 ≤ y t,n are equipped with dual variables αt,n ,
pper bounds y t,n ≤ y¯ n with βt,n , and the market clearing condi-
ion (15c) with λt . Note that a price equilibrium directly follows
rom (18a) , i.e., 
p t,n i (d t,n i ) = p t,n j (d t,n j ) for all n i , n j ∈ N dem , t ∈ T (19)
olds. Thus, it is reasonable to introduce the notation p t (indepen-
ent of a demand node n ) for the spot market price in time pe-
iod t . Combining (18a) and (18b) yields 
t,n = p t − c var n + αt,n for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T . (20)
From now on, we assume that no node n i dominates an-
ther node n j , i.e., we exclude the situation in which c 
inv 
n i 
<
 
inv 
n j 
and c var n i < c 
var 
n j 
holds. Moreover, we assume that all variable
osts c var n , n ∈ N = { n 1 , . . . , n | N| } , are positive and pairwise distinct
nd that the nodes are ordered such that 
 < c var n 1 < c 
var 
n 2 
< · · · < c var n | N| 
olds. These assumptions allow us to state the following lemma,
hich follows directly from the optimality of spot market solu-
ions: 
emma 1. For every time step t ∈ T there exists a node index i such
hat 
¯
 
new 
n j 
= y t,n j for all j < i , 
 = y t,n j for all j > i , 
 ≤ y t,n i < y¯ new n i , 
olds for every optimal solution d , y , and y¯ new of the spot market
odel. 
In what follows, we use the index sets 
 
= 
i : = { t ∈ T : y t, n i = y¯ new n i , y t, n j = 0 for all j > i } , 
 
< 
i : = { t ∈ T : 0 < y t, n i < y¯ new n i , y t, n j = 0 for all j > i } . 
n order to compute ∇ ϕ ¯y new we now consider the KKT condi-
ion (18c) . By subtracting the equation for node n i +1 from the one
or n i and using (20) we obtain 
i +1 ,i + 
∑ 
t∈T = 
i 
p t = 0 , 
here γi +1 ,i only depends on variable and investment costs. Here,
e used the price equilibrium (19) , condition (20) , and Lemma 1 .
e now apply Gaussian elimination steps in which we replace the
quation of node n i by the difference of equation for node n i and
f node n i +1 for i = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 . The equation of the last node
tays untouched. This gives 
i +1 ,i + 
∑ 
t∈T = 
i 
p t = 0 , for all i = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 , (21a)
c inv n | N| − ϕ + 
∑ 
t∈T = | N| 
(p t − c var n | N| ) = 0 . (21b)
We make the additional assumption (which is in line with our
ase studies) that the price functions are linear, i.e., p t,n (d t,n ) =
 t,n − s n d t,n , where a t,n > 0 is the intercept with the price axis
nd −s n < 0 is the slope. Note that ﬂuctuation is only modeled by
hifted intercepts whereas the slope of the price functions stays
he same. Furthermore, we need the well-known notion of so-
alled inverse market demand functions P t ( D t ), which represent
he price functions for the aggregated market demand in time
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β  tep t . They are given as P t (D t ) = A t + SD t with 
 t = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
d t,n , A t = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem a t,n /s n ∑ 
n ∈ N dem 1 /s n 
, S = − 1 ∑ 
n ∈ N dem 1 /s n 
. (22)
The inverse demand functions can be derived as follows: First
olve the single demand functions for d t,n , yielding d t,n = (a t,n −
p t,n ) /s n . Since all prices are equal for all nodes, we have 
 t = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
d t,n = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
(a t,n − p t,n ) /s n = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
a t,n /s n − P t 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
1 /s n 
ielding (22) . This fact allows to rewrite (21) as 
i +1 ,i + 
∑ 
t∈T = 
i 
P t 
( 
i ∑ 
k =1 
y¯ new n k 
) 
= 0 , for all i = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 , (23a) 
c inv n | N| − ϕ + 
∑ 
t∈T = | N| 
( 
P t 
( ∑ 
n ∈ N 
y¯ new n 
) 
− c var n | N| 
) 
= 0 . (23b) 
We now additionally assume γi +1 ,i  = 0 for all i = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 .
q. (23a) then uniquely deﬁne y¯ new n i for i = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 and do
ot depend on the fee ϕ. Thus, we have 
∂ ¯y new n i 
∂ϕ 
= 0 for all i = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 . (24)
In addition, the remaining partial derivative is given by the fol-
owing lemma. 
emma 2. It holds 
: = 
∂ ¯y new n | N| 
∂ϕ 
(|T = | N| | S) −1 < 0 . 
roof. Eq. (23b) is an equation of the form
 ( ¯y new n 1 (ϕ) , . . . , ¯y 
new 
n | N| (ϕ) ;ϕ) = 0 . Thus, (24) and the implicit
unction theorem imply 
∂F 
∂ ¯y new n | N| 
∂ ¯y new n | N| 
∂ϕ 
= − ∂F 
∂ϕ 
. 
The claim follows since ∂ ϕ F = −1 and 
∂F 
∂ ¯y new n | N| 
= 
∑ 
t∈T = | N| 
S. 

It can be easily shown that |T = | N| | > 0 , justifying the deﬁnition
f . Using the previous lemma, we ﬁnally obtain the following
onotonicity criterion: 
heorem 1. Let the spot market and redispatch model with lin-
ar demand functions and network fee ϕ be given as in (15) and
16) . Furthermore, let ˆ ψ redi be the optimal value of the redispatch
odel, y¯ new n , n ∈ N, be the spot market optimal capacity generation
nvestment,  be as deﬁned in Lemma 2 and let γi +1 ,i  = 0 for all
 = 1 , . . . , | N| − 1 . Then, the budget function is strictly increasing in
0, ϕ] if 
gcb : = ∂ 
ˆ ψ redi 
∂ ¯y new n | N| 
+ −1 
∑ 
n ∈ N 
y¯ new n − c inv n | N| < 0 (25) 
olds. 
roof. From the preceding computations it directly follows that
 ϕ μ > 0 holds if and only if gcb < 0 holds. Additionally, gcb is
trictly decreasing in y¯ new n , n ∈ N: The second derivative of the op-
imal value function of the redispatch model (ﬁrst term) vanishesue to the envelope theorem and because the capacities appear
nly linearly in the Lagrangian. The second term also vanishes after
ifferentiating, and the derivative of the third term is −1 , which
s also negative. Moreover, gcb is increasing in the fee ϕ because
¯ new n , n ∈ N, are decreasing in ϕ. 
As a consequence, the correctness of the binary search follows if
25) holds for the generation capacity corresponding to the upper
ound ϕ¯ . In order to check (25) in practice, we ﬁnally note that the
rst term can be expressed by the dual variables of the redispatch
odel. From standard sensitivity analysis of convex optimization
cf., Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004 ) we obtain 
∂ ˆ ψ redi 
∂ ¯y new n | N| 
= 
∑ 
t∈ T 
βt,n | N| 
olds, where βt,n | N| , t ∈ T , are the optimal dual variables of the up-
er bounds in (16b) . 
.1.2. Monotonicity of the TSO’s budget function for the energy based 
ee 
In order to show the correctness of the binary search algorithm
or the case of the energy based fee ϕ = ϕ eb , we consider the
lightly modiﬁed spot market model 
max 
,y, ¯y new 
ψ spot : = 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
∫ d t,n 
0 
p t,n (x ) d x 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N 
( 
c inv n y¯ 
new 
n + 
∑ 
t∈ T 
c var n y t,n 
) 
−
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
ϕd t,n 
s.t. 0 ≤ y t,n ≤ y¯ new n for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T , ∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
d t,n −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
y t,n = 0 for all t ∈ T . 
The redispatch model (16) stays the same. With these models
t hand, we can rewrite the budget function as 
(ϕ) = ˆ ψ redi ( ¯y new (ϕ)) − ˆ ψ spot (ϕ) −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
c inv n y¯ 
new 
n (ϕ) . 
Thus, the budget function is strictly increasing in ϕ if 
d μ
d ϕ 
= (∇ y¯ new ˆ ψ redi ) T ∇ ϕ ¯y new + 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
d t,n −
∑ 
n ∈ N 
c inv n 
∂ ¯y new n 
∂ϕ 
> 0 
(26) 
olds. As before, 
∂ ˆ ψ redi 
∂ ¯y new n 
= 
∑ 
t∈ T 
βt,n 
s known from standard sensitivity analysis. Thus, we have to com-
ute ∇ ϕ ¯y new . The main strategy is the same as for the generation
apacity based fee. Dual feasibility conditions of the spot market
odel read 
p t,n (d t,n ) − ϕ + λt = 0 for all n ∈ N dem , t ∈ T , 
c var n + αt,n − βt,n − λt = 0 for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T , 
−c inv n + 
∑ 
t∈ T 
βt,n = 0 for all n ∈ N. 
As before, the ﬁrst condition implies the equilibrium of spot
arket prices (19) for each time step t ∈ T . Thus, λt can be elimi-
ated in the ﬁrst two conditions yielding 
t,n = p t − c var n − ϕ + αt,n for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T . (27)
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oUsing the same techniques as in the last section, we obtain 
∂ 
∂ϕ 
( 
i ∑ 
k =1 
y¯ new n k 
) 
= 1 
S 
for all i = 1 , . . . , | N| , 
which readily implies 
∂ ¯y new n 1 
∂ϕ 
= 1 
S 
, 
∂ ¯y new n i 
∂ϕ 
= 0 for all i = 2 , . . . , | N| . 
This implies the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. Let the spot market and redispatch model with linear
demand functions and network fee ϕ be given as in (26) and (16) .
Furthermore, let ˆ ψ redi be the optimal value of the redispatch model
and y¯ new n , n ∈ N, be the spot market optimal capacity generation in-
vestments. Then, the budget function is strictly increasing in [0, ϕ] if
eb : = ∂ 
ˆ ψ redi 
∂ ¯y new n 1 
+ S 
∑ 
n ∈ N dem 
∑ 
t∈ T 
d t,n − c inv n 1 < 0 (28)
holds. 
Proof. From the preceding computations it directly follows that
d ϕ μ > 0 is equivalent to eb < 0 . By the same arguments as be-
fore, it can be shown that the demands d t,n are decreasing in ϕ.
Since S < 0, this implies that the second term is increasing in ϕ.
Thus, eb is increasing in ϕ. 
In other words, the last theorem shows the correctness of the
binary search algorithm for energy based fees and values of ϕ¯ that
fulﬁll criterion (28) . 
6.2. Computing upper network fee bounds 
Given the importance of appropriate network fee bounds, we
take the following strategy. In all network fee regimes we use
zero as a lower bound excluding negative fees. Then, we compute
monopoly solutions of the spot market scenario (cf. model (15) )
and derive the respective monopoly markups. We use these
markups as upper bounds. In the case of the energy based fee, we
use the average monopoly markup across all time periods and mar-
ket zones as an upper bound. In the case of the generation capacity
based fee, we use the cumulative monopoly markup across all time
periods, where total generation capacity is binding in a given zone.
To obtain the upper bound we then take averages over all mar-
ket zones. In our computational study (cf. Section 7 ) the obtained
upper bounds fulﬁll the criteria developed in the last section (cf.
conditions (25) and (28) ) and thus lead to a well-deﬁned search
strategy. 
6.3. Reduction strategy for the set of network conﬁgurations 
An ingenuous way of incorporating all possible network conﬁg-
urations by simply introducing binary variables for every extension
and degradation typically yields very large mixed-integer problems
that are hard to solve in practice. In order to reduce the number
of combinatorial choices, we model network extensions and degra-
dations in the following way: By L new 
jk 
⊆ L inter ∩ L new we denote the
set of candidate transmission lines and by L ex 
jk 
the set of existing
lines between zone Z j and zone Z k . Moreover, let jk denote the
set of transmission capacities between the two zones that can be
realized by an investment in or a degradation of a (sub)set of lines
between the zones, i.e., 
 jk : = 
{ 
f¯ jk = 
∑ 
l∈X 
f¯ l : ∅ ⊆ X ⊆ (L new jk ∪ L ex jk ) 
} 
. Since intra-zone transmission capacities do not affect spot mar-
et trading, intra-zone network modiﬁcations do not have to be
onsidered in the subproblem. This allows us to iterate only over
he set of inter-zone network modiﬁcations in the outer loop of
lg 1 . Moreover, we do not iterate over the speciﬁc network con-
gurations but over the set of relevant capacities, i.e., over all ele-
ents of ∏ 
 j ,Z k ∈ Z, j  = k 
 jk . 
This way, the constraint for f¯ jk ∈  jk of a zonal version of the
arket splitting ﬂow restrictions (12) reads 
f¯ jk ≤
∑ 
l=( j,k ) ∈ L inter 
f t,l ≤ f¯ jk for all t ∈ T . 
On the other hand, the master problem determines both a wel-
are maximizing intra-zone network extension and a welfare max-
mizing inter-zone network extension that yields the predeﬁned
nter-zone transmission capacity of the given network extension
nd degradation plan. Thus, the master problem is additionally re-
tricted by the following constraint: ∑ 
∈ L ex 
jk 
(1 − z ex l ) ¯f l + 
∑ 
l∈ L new 
jk 
z new l f¯ l = f¯ jk for all Z j , Z k with j  = k. 
Note that this reduction technique is only possible if physical
ine characteristics other than thermal capacities do not play a role
n the spot market. 
Taking all together, the ﬁxation of a network extension yields a
oncave-quadratic maximization over a polyhedral set for the sub-
roblem and additionally relaxing the budget constraint yields a
oncave-quadratic mixed-integer maximization with respect to lin-
ar constraints for the master problem. 
. Case studies 
In this section we discuss computational results for two promi-
ent test networks from the literature. The ﬁrst example is taken
rom Jenabi et al. (2013) and consists of three nodes. The second
est network is a six-node example by Chao and Peck (1998) that
as been widely used in the energy market literature. For both test
ases (consisting of the network structure as well as demand and
ost parameters) we compute 
(1) the welfare optimum of the integrated planner model; 
(2) the market outcomes in the case of a market model without
market splitting. 
For the six-node example we additionally compute 
(3) the market outcomes in the case of a market model with
market splitting. 
For the market models we consider all three different network
ee regimes, i.e., the lump sum, the energy based, and the gener-
tion capacity based fee. Note that we transformed all parameters
nto equivalent annual hourly values. 
We implemented the market model as well as the integrated
lanner model in Zimpl (see Koch, 2004 ) and used SCIP (see
chterberg, 2009 ) to generate corresponding mps ﬁles. Finally, we
olved the problems using CPLEX 12.5.1; see CPLEX (2013) . All ex-
eriments were performed on a 12 core computer equipped with
wo AMD Opteron(tm) 2435 Processors and 64 gigabyte DDR2-
AM. Using the binary search algorithm described in the last sec-
ion, every instance is solved within seconds. This indicates that
ur method also seems quite promising for larger test instances. 
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Table 5 
Computational results for the three-node example. 
Integrated planner 1 price zone 
ϕ ls ϕ eb ϕ gcb 
Network fee – 51.20 12.01 25.66 
TSO revenues – 51.20 47.02 40.54 
Redispatch costs (dollars) – 47.20 43.02 36.54 
Producer proﬁts (dollars) – 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Consumer surplus (dollars) – 1040.44 1044.04 1050.06 
Normalized welfare (percent) 100 96.08 96.41 96.97 
Absolute welfare (dollars) 1082.92 1040.44 1044.04 1050.06 
Candidate line investment Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investment node 1 (megawatt) 0.11 0 0 0 
Investment node 2 (megawatt) 1.49 1.66 1.63 1.58 
Fig. 4. Three-node test network. 
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c  .1. The three-node test network 
Before we present our main results, we brieﬂy review the input
ata that is directly taken from Jenabi et al. (2013) . The graph con-
ists of three nodes, three existing lines, and one candidate line as
epicted in Fig. 4 , where all physical and economical data of the
etwork are given. We allow for both investment in the transmis-
ion network and in generation capacity. We consider four time
eriods and assume that at the beginning of the planning horizon
here are no existing generators but explicitly model generation in-
estment. Node 1 and node 2 are generation nodes. Technology 1
an be built at node 1 and technology 2 can be built at node 2.
he equivalent availability of generation capacity is 80 percent. 
Consumers are located at node 3. We assume that the demand
unction is p = 550 − 500 d. To give the four periods some simple
nterpretation, we refer to them as the four seasons spring, sum-
er, autumn, and winter. For this reason, we multiply the intercept
f the above demand function by 1, 0.5, 1, and 1.5 in time period
–4, respectively. 
.1.1. Discussion 
Table 5 presents the computational results for the three node
etwork. The table compares the ﬁrst best solution (which would
esult from a nodal pricing approach) to an energy-only market
ith a single price zone. The integrated planner approach yields
 social welfare of 1083 dollars. An energy-only market without
arket splitting, i.e., one price zone, implies a welfare loss as com-
ared to the ﬁrst best solution in all three network fee regimes. In
he case of a generation capacity based fee, an energy based fee,nd a lump sum fee the realized welfare levels are 1050 dollars,
044 dollars, and 1040 dollars, respectively. 
This welfare loss is mainly driven by a distortion of generation
nvestment. As Table 5 illustrates, the solution to the integrated
lanner problem implies positive investment in both technologies,
here investment in technology 2—which has lower investment
ost—is much larger. In contrast, the trilevel power market model
ields generation investment only in technology 2, as technology 1
ould earn too little on the spot market to recover investment
ost. Generation investment in technology 2 in the trilevel power
arket model is higher than in the welfare optimum implying an
verinvestment at node 2 for all network fee regimes—lowest for
he generation capacity based fee, highest for the lump sum fee. 
The three considered network fee regimes have different effects
n investment decisions in generation capacity. The intuition is as
ollows. If the fee is collected based on installed capacity ( ϕ gcb ),
he fee directly increases investment cost. This obviously decreases
nvestment incentives as compared to a regime with a lump sum
ee ( ϕ ls ), which would not enter a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition. This
mmediately explains the fact that less capacity is invested under
 capacity based fee than under a lump sum fee. Now consider
he energy based fee ϕ eb . The energy based fee reduces the rev-
nues collected at the spot market (by the fee per megawatt hour)
nd thereby also decreases the investment incentives as compared
o a lump sum fee. However, investment is more beneﬁcial than
nder a capacity based fee that collects the same overall revenue
or the TSO, since contributions to cover network cost are also col-
ected from infra-marginal production, which does not affect the
rst-order condition that determines optimal investment. For in-
estment in only one technology—as in our example—this explains
he observed differences in installed generation capacity at node 2.
Even though generation investment is ineﬃcient in the solution
f our market model as compared to the ﬁrst best solution, line
nvestment is equivalent to the ﬁrst best in all three scenarios: The
andidate line connecting the nodes 1 and 2 is build in the trilevel
ower market model as well as in the welfare optimum. 
In total, the capacity based fee produces the lowest welfare dis-
ortion in our example. This is due to the fact that overinvestment
s less severe than under the other regimes. Consequently, in this
articular example, welfare is highest with a capacity based fee.
owever, note that this does not indicate that capacity based fees
re generally the most desirable choice among the considered net-
ork fee regimes. This will become clear in the second example
hat we present in Section 7.2 . 
Let us ﬁnally motivate why we do not consider market split-
ing in the three node example. In the considered network, the
wo lines connecting the consumer to the ﬁrms each have suf-
cient capacity to transmit the entire production in any period.
apacity constraints in the network occur solely due to the low
apacity of the line connecting the generators, which restricts
506 V. Grimm et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 254 (2016) 493–509 
Fig. 5. Six-node test network. 
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5 Alternatively, one could choose random draws from a distribution that reﬂects 
the nature of demand ﬂuctuation in electricity markets. 
6 Note that it cannot be generally shown that market splitting increases welfare 
in electricity markets if investment is considered as an endogenous choice. Grimm 
et al. (2015a) show in a three node network, that market splitting can actually de- 
crease welfare for badly conﬁgured zones. available capacity at the other two lines due to loop ﬂows. As a
consequence, market splitting with inter-zonal capacities that are
equal to nominal inter-zonal line capacities would not be effective,
since desired transmission would never exceed these transfer ca-
pacities. Market splitting into two zones could become effective if
substantially lower inter-zonal capacities were considered in the
context of market splitting. Since such a choice of low inter-zonal
capacities would somehow be arbitrary, we abstain from calculat-
ing an example and refer the reader to the discussion of the six
node network for the consideration of price zones, or to Grimm,
Martin, Weibelzahl, and Zöttl (2015a) . 
7.2. The six-node test network 
While the three node network provides some intuition for dif-
ferent levels of generation investment under different network fee
regimes, we do not obtain insights on the effects, which the mar-
ket design and in particular the conﬁguration of price zones may
have on transmission line expansion. On top of that, we already
emphasized that the desirability of different network fee regimes
might depend on details of the environment. In the following
we consider an adapted 52-period test example based on Chao
and Peck (1998) in order to illustrate these issues and to pro-
vide further intuition. The network of this example has extensively
been analyzed in the literature to illustrate different ener gy mar-
ket models. We extend the original test example by several aspects
that are speciﬁc to our approach, such as ﬂuctuating demand, gen-
eration investment, network investment, and a cost-based redis-
patch mechanism. 
As Fig. 5 illustrates, the network consists of six nodes connected
by eight existing transmission lines (solid). Northern nodes (nodes
1–3) and southern nodes (nodes 4–6) are interconnected by lines
with unlimited capacities. The “northern zone” and the “southern
zone” are interconnected by only two lines with limited capacities.e consider a situation where two different candidate transmis-
ion lines (dashed) can be built to alleviate congestion problems.
he technical line data as well as all other data is given in Fig. 5 .
he equivalent availability of generation capacity is 80 percent. 
We again assume that there are no existing generators but
xplicitly model generation investment. Generation units can be
uilt at nodes 1, 2, and 4. Demand is located at nodes 3, 5,
nd 6. The basic demand functions are p 3 = 37 . 5 − −0 . 05 d 3 , p 5 =
5 − 0 . 1 d 5 , p 6 = 80 − 0 . 1 d 6 . Assuming these three demand func-
ions taken from Chao and Peck (1998) we use real-world data to
nduce demand ﬂuctuation across the 52 periods at all nodes. 5 In
articular, we use factors derived from the German demand real-
zations of 2011 for shifting the demand functions; see ENTSO-E
2012b) . Demand levels across nodes in a given period are always
hifted by the same factor, which accounts for the fact that the
evel of demand in a given period is typically correlated across de-
and nodes. 
.2.1. Discussion 
Table 6 summarizes the computational results for the six node
xample for three different scenarios concerning the cost of line
nvestment (190,0 0 0 dollars, 230,0 0 0 dollars, and 270,0 0 0 dollars).
e compare the ﬁrst best solution (which corresponds to the out-
ome of a nodal pricing regime) to two market designs with an
nergy-only market with one and with two price zones. In our
xample, market splitting (two price zones) signiﬁcantly increases
elfare as compared to a single price zone, but welfare does not
chieve its optimal level. 6 We also show that the network fee
egime matters for generation investment and welfare. In all sce-
arios, investment in generation capacity is (ceteris paribus) high-
st under a lump sum fee, second highest under an energy based
ee, and lowest under a capacity based fee. We provided a gen-
ral intuition for this in Section 7.1.1 . The six node example illus-
rates clearly, however, that higher (or lower) generation invest-
ent does not automatically translate into lower (or higher) wel-
are. It is rather the particular interplay of line investment, gen-
ration investment, and production schedules that determines the
verall welfare effect. In the scenarios that we consider there is
or each network fee regime at least one case where this particu-
ar regime is welfare superior to the other two regimes. It is more-
ver notable that overinvestment due to a lump sum network fee
s much more severe in the single zone setup, which may con-
ribute to the fact that the lump sum fee is never optimal (in our
xample) in combination with a single zone. 
Table 6 also illustrates investment decisions in transmission line
xpansion for the different scenarios. In the welfare optimum the
ocial planner refrains from transmission line expansion and in-
tead installs positive generation capacities at all nodes, unless line
nvestment cost is low. If investment cost is low, he expands one
f the two lines. Obviously, from a welfare perspective investment
n generation capacity at node 4 is preferable to line investment,
lthough variable production cost of the available technology is
ubstantially higher than variable cost of technologies available at
orthern nodes. Furthermore, due to the fact that demand satis-
ed by northern generators is relatively low in the absence of line
nvestment, in the welfare optimum more generation capacity is
uilt at node 2, where investment cost is lower than at node 1,
ut variable generation cost is higher. 
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Table 6 
Computational results for the six-node example for three different line investment costs; all values are rounded to full dollars. 
Integrated planner 1 price zone 2 price zones 
ϕ ls ϕ eb ϕ gcb ϕ ls ϕ eb ϕ gcb 
Line investment costs: 190,0 0 0 dollars 
Fee – 1,619,431 17 712 402,303 6 259 
TSO revenues (dollars) – 1,619,431 1,036,227 1036226 402,303 377,776 383,379 
Redispatch costs (dollars) – 1,239,431 656,224 656225 212,303 187,774 193,379 
Producer proﬁts (dollars) – 0 0 0 692,250 689,879 692,250 
Consumer surplus (dollars) – 1,628,329 2,015,004 2,015,003 1,706,537 1,708,245 1,698,794 
Normalized welfare (percent) 100 64 79 79 95 94 94 
Welfare (dollars) 2,537,738 1,628,329 2,015,004 2,015,003 2,398,787 2,398,124 2,391,044 
Inv. line 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inv. line 2 no Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Inv. node 1 (megawatt) 627 2009 1456 1456 1317 1218 1216 
Inv. node 2 (megawatt) 669 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inv. node 4 (megawatt) 370 0 0 0 370 275 263 
Line investment costs: 230,0 0 0 dollars 
Fee – 1,693,312 18 749 442,303 7 289 
TSO revenues (dollars) – 1,693,312 1,068,789 1,068,788 442,303 414,891 421,034 
Redispatch costs (dollars) – 1,463,312 838,787 838788 212,303 184,891 191,034 
Producer proﬁts (dollars) – 0 0 0 692,250 689,418 692,250 
Consumer surplus (dollars) – 1,554,448 1,961,346 1,961,345 1,666,537 1,665,456 1,654,695 
Normalized welfare (percent) 100 62 78 78 94 94 94 
Welfare (dollars) 2,501,238 1,554,448 1,961,346 1,961,345 2,358,787 2,354,873 2,346,945 
Inv. line 1 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inv. line 2 No No No No No No No 
Inv. node 1 (megawatt) 252 2009 1427 1427 1317 1206 1205 
Inv. node 2 (megawatt) 794 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inv. node 4 (megawatt) 620 0 0 0 370 264 251 
Line investment costs: 270,0 0 0 dollars 
Fee – 1,733,312 18 769 266,560 4 164 
TSO revenues (dollars) – 1,733,312 1,085,707 1,085,708 266,560 249,951 254,321 
Redispatch costs (dollars) – 1,463,312 815,709 815,708 266,560 24 9,94 8 254,321 
Producer proﬁts (dollars) – 0 0 0 479,250 479,250 479,250 
Consumer surplus (dollars) – 1,514,448 1,932,418 1,932,419 1,842,280 1,848,738 1,843,822 
Normalized welfare (percent) 100 61 77 77 93 93 93 
Welfare (dollars) 2,501,238 1,514,448 1,932,418 1,932,419 2,321,530 2,327,988 2,323,072 
Inv. line 1 No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Inv. line 2 No No No No No No No 
Inv. node 1 (megawatt) 252 2009 1412 1412 1067 1004 1003 
Inv. node 2 (megawatt) 794 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inv. node 4 (megawatt) 620 0 0 0 620 560 552 
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t  In the scenarios with an energy-only market and one single
rice zone at least one line is built in any scenario (i.e., for all com-
inations of line investment costs and network fee regimes). If line
nvestment cost is low, both lines are built. Investment in gener-
tion capacity takes place exclusively at node 1, where the tech-
ology with the lowest variable production cost is located. This is
ue to the fact that no other generator could sell its capacity at
he spot market. In case of a lump sum network fee, generation
nvestment is substantially higher, while energy based and capac-
ty based fees lead to the same extent of generation investment.
elfare is lowest under the lump sum fee, which suggests sub-
tantial overinvestment. Energy and capacity based fees yield the
ame welfare results. 
We moreover consider scenarios with market splitting and two
rice zones. Line investment is lower (or sometimes equal) as com-
ared to a single zone, but in some scenarios higher than in the
elfare optimum. Market splitting induces generation investment
t node 4, the more the fewer lines are built. In all scenarios in-
estment is suboptimally distributed across the nodes in the north-
rn zone. While a substantial investment at node 2 would be wel-
are optimal, ﬁrms invest exclusively at node 1 in the northern
one, due to missing price signals within the zone. The welfare op-
imal network fee regime with two price zones is the energy based
ee in the scenario with high line investment costs (where no line
s built), and the lump sum fee otherwise. p  Prices for the case of an energy based fee and line investment
ost of 270,0 0 0 dollars are shown in Fig. 6 and support the above
ntuition. In the welfare optimal solution, prices at the consump-
ion nodes are low in the north (node 3) and high in the south
nodes 5 and 6). With one price zone the spot market price is rel-
tively high. However, generators with high unit production cost
ave no possibility to contract their supply at the spot market. Two
rice zones imply a north–south spread, which induces investment
n the south. 
. Conclusion and outlook 
This paper analyzes the long-run impact of different transmis-
ion management regimes on investment incentives of generating
rms in a market environment with a regulated TSO. We propose a
rilevel optimization approach to model an electricity market with
ost-based redispatch both with and without market splitting, ac-
ounting for different network fee regimes. As a ﬁrst best bench-
ark we also solve the corresponding integrated planner problem,
n which a central planner controls both the grid and generation
nits. In order to solve our trilevel problem computationally, we
resent a reformulation that relies on a detailed analysis of the in-
erconnection between the three problem levels. We apply our ap-
roach to two simple test instances in order to demonstrate the
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Fig. 6. Spot market and nodal prices for the energy based fee and line investment costs of 270,0 0 0 dollars. Nodal prices (gray) for node 3 (solid), node 5 (dotted), and node 
6 (dashed) as well as spot market prices (black) for one zone (solid) and two zones (north: dotted; south: dashed). 
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C  capabilities to analyze transmission and capacity expansion in a
market environment. 
Our results show that in a market environment investment
choices by the TSO and by private ﬁrms can substantially differ
from welfare optimal choices. In our case studies, generation in-
vestment in the welfare optimum is distributed across all possi-
ble supply locations, which would also be obtained under a nodal
pricing regime in our setup. In a market environment with a uni-
form electricity price at all nodes, generation investment is typi-
cally concentrated at the node where the available technology ex-
hibits lowest variable production cost. This is due to the fact that
technologies with higher production cost (but probably lower in-
vestment cost) cannot contract their supply at the spot market and
thus would have no chance to recover their investment cost. Split-
ting the market into zones alleviates the problem that generation
investment is concentrated at particular nodes. However, distor-
tions remain unless each node constitutes a zone. 
Line investment by the TSO clearly reacts to anticipated gener-
ation investment. Distributed capacity in the welfare optimum is
complemented by no or only minor network expansion. Concen-
trated generation investment at single nodes in a market environ-
ment with one price zone implies extensive expansion up to the
maximum level. The introduction of price zones leads to an inter-
mediate level of line expansion. Obviously, a market environment
where transmission cost is not reﬂected in the prices induces over-
investment in line expansion, which is sometimes even coupled
with overinvestment in generation capacity. 
Our model moreover allows to compare different network fee
regimes. In our case studies we compare three regimes, a lump
sum fee, an energy based fee collected upon production, as well
as a capacity based fee. From a theoretical perspective the lump
sum fee should give rise to higher generation investment than the
energy based fee, and the capacity based fee should trigger low-
est generation investment (see also Ruderer and Zöttl (2012) for
a thorough theoretical analysis). This is due to the fact that the
lump sum fee does not affect the ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrms
investment choice problem, whereas the capacity based fee and
the energy based fee increase investment cost (capacity based fee)
or decrease marginal returns (energy based fee) and thereby de-
crease investment incentives. Our analysis clearly shows that the
clear ranking in terms of investment incentives does not translate
in a welfare ranking in a simple way. Whether high or low genera-
tion investment is preferable from a welfare point of view crucially
depends on where exactly the investment takes place, and whether
the installed capacity can be utilized. Our computations reveal that
any network fee regime can be the optimal one, depending on the
scenario under consideration. In summary, in this paper we develop a trilevel model that al-
ows to compare different market designs in electricity markets
nd to assess their effects on long-run investment decisions in net-
ork and generation capacity. Thus, our approach is an important
nd obvious extension of the literature that up to now has mainly
onsidered the short-run properties of different transmission man-
gement regimes. Computational results that we report from two
ase studies demonstrate that transmission management can have
ubstantial effects in the long-run when generation and transmis-
ion expansion are taken into account. Further research will extend
he insights by applying the method to existing networks and by
xtending the model in order to capture further aspects of com-
on market designs. 
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